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THE PERSONNEL MANUAL EXCEPTION TO EMPLOY-
MENT-AT-WILL: IS JOB SECURITY MERELY AN ILLU-
SION?-Stewart v. Chevron Chemical Co., 111 Wash. 2d 609, 762
P.2d 1143 (1988).
Abstract: Washington recognizes the personnel manual exception to the employment-
at-will doctrine but applies the exception restrictively. In Stewart v. Chevron Chemical
Co., the Washington Supreme Court reversed a plaintiff's judgment for wrongful dis-
charge. This Note analyzes the court's decision and finds it a step backward from previous
Washington law establishing exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine. After Stewart,
Washington provides less protection for employees than do other states. This Note sug-
gests that a better rule would allow the trier of fact to decide whether a personnel manual
is contractually binding.
In the past decade, most jurisdictions have modified the employ-
ment-at-will doctrine which creates a presumption that employment is
"at-will" and terminable by either party at any time for any reason.'
Washington state recognizes four exceptions to the employment-at-
will doctrine. Among these is the limitation an employer's written
personnel policy may place on the right to discharge employees.
Employers issue personnel policies, at least in part, to create an
atmosphere of fairness and job security in the workplace.2 In return,
the employer gains orderly, cooperative, and loyal employees.
Employers expect employees to abide by personnel manual policies,
justifying employees in believing that employers will do the same.
Because employers derive substantial benefits from written personnel
policies, and because employees reasonably rely on those policies,
employers may not treat the promises they contain as illusory.3
1. The employment-at-will doctrine developed in the United States at the end of the
nineteenth century. Horace C. Wood defined the rule in 1877 in his treatise, Master and Servant.
Mauk, Wrongful Discharge: The Erosion of 100 Years of Employer Privilege, 21 IDAHo L. REV.
201, 202 (1985) (advocating judicial reform of the doctrine). Wood criticized previous cases
which held that a promise to pay wages at a certain interval is presumed to be a hiring for the
interval specified. Larson, Why We Should Not Abandon the Presumption that Employment Is
Terminable At-Will, 23 IDAHo L. REv. 219, 222 (1986) (advocating retention of the doctrine).
Courts interpreted the rule to mean that, unless there is an express agreement to the contrary,
employment can be terminated by either employer or employee for any or no cause. Mauk,
supra, at 202. Employment-at-will originally was adopted to protect employees. Larson, supra,
at 227. Previously, employees who failed to work for the entire term for which they were hired
forfeited all wages, including those for the time actually worked. Id.
2. Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 229, 685 P.2d 1081, 1087 (1984). For
the Thompson court's discussion of the purpose of personnel manuals, see id. at 229-30, 685 P.2d
at 1087-88.
3. Id. at 230, 685 P.2d at 1088.
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In Stewart v. Chevron Chemical Co.,4 the Washington Supreme
Court reversed a judgment awarding damages to an employee whom
the jury found was fired in violation of his employer's written person-
nel policies.5 The court reasoned that the language in a personnel
manual did not create a contractual obligation. Further, the court
found that there was no evidence that the employee relied on the per-
sonnel manual's promise of fair treatment.6
Stewart makes it more difficult to require employers to honor per-
sonnel policies that employees reasonably believe protect the employ-
ees from unexpected discharge. The decision overprotects employers,
who already have greater protection from wrongful discharge suits
under Washington law than under the laws of many other jurisdic-
tions. Finally, Stewart favors employers who treat their employees
thoughtlessly or dishonestly and puts honest and careful employers at
a competitive disadvantage.
Cases from other jurisdictions provide general principles that could
guide the Washington courts' future decisions. These cases balance
the interests of employers and employees. In particular, these cases
assign responsibility for interpreting the language of an employer's
personnel manual to the trier of fact. The trier of fact also determines
whether an employee relied on the manual.
I. APPLYING THE PERSONNEL MANUAL EXCEPTION TO
THE EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL DOCTRINE
A. The Employment-at- Will Doctrine and Its Exceptions
1. The Employment-at- Will Doctrine in the United States
Until recently, all fifty states held that employment for an indefinite
period is presumed to be "at-will" and terminable by either party at
any time for any or no cause.7 In the last half-century, the ability of
wage-earners to make employment changes has decreased.' Even
advocates of the employment-at-will doctrine recognize the cost to
employees of changing jobs and the lack of security most employees
4. 111 Wash. 2d 609, 762 P.2d 1143 (1988).
5. Id. at 614, 762 P.2d at 1146. For the rationale of the Stewart holding, see id. at 613-14,
762 P.2d at 1145-46.
6. Id. at 614, 762 P.2d at 1146.
7. Mauk, supra note 1, at 202. The employment-at-will doctrine was a departure from Anglo-
Saxon law. From the fourteenth to the mid-eighteenth century, servants were hired by the year
and could not be discharged except for reasonable cause. Id. at 203.
8. Id. at 205.
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have in their livelihoods.9 The increasing vulnerability of employees
to unjust discharge has led most jurisdictions in the United States to
recognize specific exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine.' 0
2. Exceptions to the Employment-at- Will Doctrine in Washington
In Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., " the Washington Supreme
Court carved out four exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine:
(1) Employment may be terminated only for cause if there is an agree-
ment (express or implied) to that effect; (2) promises-of specific treat-
ment in specific situations in employee manuals or handbooks issued
by employers to their employees may, in appropriate situations, obli-
gate employers to act according to those promises; (3) employment
may be terminated only for cause if the employee gives consideration
in addition to the contemplated service; (4) employers may be held
liable in tort for discharges that violate a clear public purpose.1 2
Washington rejected a fifth exception recognized by many jurisdic-
tions to the employment-at-will doctrine: an implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing applied to every employment contract. 13 The
Thompson court reasoned that this exception would unjustifiably
intrude into employers' rights to manage their businesses. The court
held that implying a limitation on an employer's right to discharge
from a contract which, by its terms, carries no limitation would be
inconsistent. Finally, the court feared that such a rule would substi-
tute judicial action for collective bargaining. '4
9. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. RaV. 947, 961 (1984)
(advocating retention of the doctrine).
10. Apart from exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine, only two remedies for
wrongful discharge are available: (1) a defamation action against an employer who incorrectly
reports detrimental reasons for an employee's discharge to potential new employers (if such
communications are not privileged), Peck, Unjust Discharges From Employment: A Necessary
Change in the Law, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 5-6 (1979) (advocating judicial reform of the doctrine);
Epstein, supra note 9, at 970-71 n.40; and (2) an administrative hearing if an employee is denied
unemployment benefits because an employer stated that the employee's discharge was for cause.
Peck, supra, at 5-6. The importance of job security to most employees is evidenced by the fact
that ninety-five percent of collective bargaining agreements and the majority of public sector
employment contracts have provisions limiting the employer's right to terminate at-will. Peck,
supra, at 8-9.
11. 102 Wash. 2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984).
12. Id. at 228-33, 685 P.2d at 1087-89.
13. Id. at 227-28, 685 P.2d at 1086. For the Thompson court's rationale for rejecting the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in unjust discharge suits, see id., 685 P.2d at 1086.
14. Id. at 228, 685 P.2d at 1086-87. The reasons for the court's caution are unclear. In
Miller v. Othello Packers, 67 Wash. 2d 842, 844, 410 P.2d 33, 34 (1966), the court held that an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is implied in all contracts. The Thompson court
Washington Law Review
Under Washington's employment-at-will doctrine, employee manu-
als and other employer policy statements may limit an employer's
right to discharge employees in two ways.' 5 First, under the implied
contract exception, policy statements may contractually modify an at-
will employment contract if the employee can satisfy the contract
requirements of offer, acceptance, and consideration. Second, the
Thompson court annotinced a rule specific to the employment relation-
ship and independent of the implied contract analysis. 6 Absent a spe-
cific disclaimer, an employer's unilateral announcement of personnel
policies may become binding and modify the terms and conditions of
employment. 7 Employees must show that the employer has created
an atmosphere of fair treatment and job security through promises of
specific treatment in specific situations. Employees must further show
that they justifiably relied on these promises by remaining on the job
and not actively seeking other employment.
The Thompson court reasoned that employers issue personnel
manuals primarily to persuade their employees that their jobs are
secure and that they will be fairly treated.' 8 The employer does this,
presumably, to produce orderly, cooperative, and loyal employees.
Further, employers generally expect their employees to abide by the
policies in the employers' personnel manuals.' 9 When there is no writ-
ten employment contract and employment is for an indefinite term,
the employer retains unilateral control over the employment relation-
ship. These factors may lead to employees' justifiable reliance on the
did not explain why judicial review of whether the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing was violated is more intrusive in the employment context than in other contract cases.
The Washington Supreme Court recently held in Baldwin v. Sisters of Providence, 112 Wash.
2d 127, 139, 769 P.2d 298, 304 (1989), that a covenant of good faith may be implied in
employment contracts containing an express agreement to discharge only for cause. The
Baldwin court held that in cases involving employee discharges for cause, the reason for the
discharge must be supported by substantial evidence, which the employer reasonably believes to
be true, and must not be arbitrary, capricious, or unlawful. Id., 769 P.2d at 304. The court did
not explain why this definition could not be applied to implied contracts to discharge only for
cause without causing undue judicial intrusion.
15. Thompson, 102 Wash. 2d at 228-29, 685 P.2d at 1087. For the Thompson court's analysis
of the two ways a personnel manual can be contractually binding, see id. at 228-30, 685 P.2d at
1087-88.
16. Id. at 229, 685 P.2d at 1087.
17. For the Thompson court's analysis of what makes personnel policies binding on the
employer, see id. at 229-30, 685 P.2d at 1087-88.
18. Id. at 229, 685 P.2d at 1087. For the Thompson court's analysis of the reasons employers
issue personnel manuals, see id. at 229-30, 685 P.2d at 1087-88.
19. Id. at 230, 685 P.2d at 1088. For the Thompson court's analysis of why employees may
justifiably rely on an employer's personnel manual, see id. at 229-30, 685 P.2d at 1087-88.
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policies. For these reasons, when employers announce specific poli-
cies, they may not treat their promises as illusory.2 0
B. Stewart v. Chevron Chemical Co.
Chevron Chemical Company fired John Stewart after twenty-nine
years of service, as part of a staff reduction." The trial court held that
Chevron's supervisory manual promised specific treatment in specific
situations. The manual stated that managers should consider perform-
ance, experience, and length of service when layoffs are necessary.
The court submitted to the jury the question of whether those state-
ments modified Stewart's employment contract. 2 The jury found that
they did, and awarded Stewart $380,000 in lost wages and pension
benefits.23
On direct review, The Washington Supreme Court reversed,2' hold-
ing that the supervisory manual's use of the terms "should" and "con-
sider" precluded finding a binding contract as a matter of law.2" The
court held that "should" and "consider" imply a discretionary com-
mitment rather than a binding promise. The court further found no
evidence that Stewart knew about or relied on the layoff provision. 6
In Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., the court had previously held
that whether an employer's personnel manual statements amount to
specific promises and whether the employee relied on the statements
are issues of fact.2 7 In Stewart, the court inexplicably departed from
Thompson by treating interpretation of the policy manual's ambiguous
language as a matter of law. The court also reconsidered the jury's
finding that Stewart relied on the manual's statements.
20. Id. at 230, 685 P.2d at 1088.
21. Stewart v. Chevron Chem. Co., 111 Wash. 2d 609, 611, 762 P.2d 1143, 1144 (1988). For
a discussion of the facts of Stewart, see id., 762 P.2d at 1144.
22. Id, 762 P.2d at 1144.
23. Id., 762 P.2d at 1144.
24. Id. at 611, 615, 762 P.2d at 1144, 1146.
25. Id. at 613-14, 762 P.2d at 1145-46. For the reasons that the Stewart court interpreted the
manual's language as being nonobligatory, see id., 762 P.2d at 1145-46.
26. Id. at 614, 762 P.2d at 1146.
27. Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 233-34, 685 P.2d 1081, 1089-90
(1984). In Thompson, St. Regis Paper Company discharged Thompson from his position of
divisional controller despite satisfactory service. Id. at 221, 685 P.2d at 1083. St. Regis's
personnel manual stated that employees should be discharged in a "fair, just and equitable
manner." Id. at 224, 685 P.2d at 1085. The court reversed the trial court's summary judgment
in favor of St. Regis. Id at 234, 685 P.2d at 1090. The court ruled that the effect of St. Regis's
personnel manual on the employment relationship-i.e., whether the manual statements
amounted to specific promises and whether Thompson relied on the statements-were issues of
fact. Id. at 233-34, 685 P.2d at 1089-90. Such facts would determine whether Thompson's
firing violated a modification of his at-will contract with St. Regis.
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C. Influential Decisions from Other Jurisdictions
In 1980, the Michigan Supreme Court in Toussaint v. Blue Cross &
Blue Shield28 recognized that personnel manuals may modify at-will
employment contracts without other evidence of a mutual agreement
between the parties.29 Most jurisdictions have adopted some variety of
the Toussaint rule.3" In Leikvold v. Valley View Community Hospi-
tal,31 the Arizona Supreme Court provided clear rules for determining
whether personnel manuals modify at-will employment contracts. A
recent California case, Foley v. Interactive Data Corp.,32 draws upon
and extends the Toussaint court's reasoning to balance employer and
employee interests.
1. Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield
In Toussaint, the Michigan Supreme Court reinstated a jury verdict
awarding damages for wrongful discharge to an employee who was
fired in violation of his employer's personnel manual.33 The manual
provided that employees would be fired only for cause.34 The
employer assured the employee at hiring that he would not be fired as
long as he did his job. The court held that the employee could recover
on either of two theories: (1) that the manual in conjunction with the
28. 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
29. In Toussaint, the court held that the employment-at-will doctrine did not apply to two
employees who inquired about job security before accepting employment, and were told they
would not be discharged except for just cause. 292 N.W.2d at 884. One employee had been
given a personnel handbook which stated that employees would be discharged for cause only. Id.
at 884. The court ruled that an employer's written personnel policies create legitimate employee
expectations which make the employment-at-will doctrine inapplicable. Id. at 885.
30. See Annotation, Right to Discharge Allegedly "At-Will" Employee as Affected by
Employer's Promulgation of Employment Policies as to Discharge, 33 A.L.R. 4th 120, 128-38
(1984 & Supp. 1988) [hereinafter Right to Discharge] ( noting that as of September 1988, twenty-
seven states recognize a cause of action for employer breaches of their personnel policy
statements on employee discharges.)
31. 141 Ariz. 544, 688 P.2d 170 (1984). In Leikvold, the court held that an employee who
was not given a grievance hearing upon dismissal as provided by her employer's personnel
manual had a valid claim for breach of contract. 688 P.2d at 171, 174.
32. 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988). In Foley, an employee, who
signed a noncompetition and invention assignment agreement as a condition of employment, was
repeatedly told his job was secure as long as his performance was adequate. 765 P.2d at 375. The
employee contended that he had an implied agreement that he would be discharged only for
cause, relying on an express personnel manual statement which outlined specific grounds for
discharge and provided certain pre-termination procedures. The court held that these
provisions, together with the employee's additional consideration and the employer's oral
assurances, supported the employee's claim of an implied contract to discharge only for cause.
Id. at 388.
33. Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at 885, 897.
34. Id. at 884. For the facts of Toussaint, see supra note 29.
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pre-employment assurance constituted an implied contract; or (2) that
the personnel manual alone was contractually binding.
The Toussaint court held that even though the term of an employ-
ment contract is indefinite, a contractual provision that an employee
will be discharged only for cause is enforceable. 6 Such a provision
may be oral or written, or result from an employee's reasonable expec-
tations based on an employer's policy statements.37  According to
Toussaint, although employers are not obligated to establish written
personnel policies, those who do secure an orderly, cooperative, and
loyal work force.38 Employees are led to believe that the employer's
policies are consistently applied and that, as long as they perform in
accordance with company policy, their jobs are secure. These benefits
accrue to employers even when employees are unaware of the
employer's particular policies and practices, and even though the
employer may change them unilaterally without notice. Having
benefitted from written personnel policies, employers may not treat
their promises as illusory.
2. Leikvold v. Valley View Community Hospital
In Leikvold, the Arizona Supreme Court held that whether an
employer's administrative manual providing for a grievance hearing
for discharged employees modifies an at-will employment contract is a
question for the trier of fact.39 According to Leikvold, the employ-
ment-at-will doctrine is merely a rule of construction for employment
contracts and should be treated, at best, as a rebuttable presumption.'
35. 292 N.W.2d at 885. Toussaint illustrates changes in judicial attitudes in response to
changing employment patterns. In 1908, the United States Supreme Court, in Adair v. United
States, 208 U.S. 161, 172-76 (1908), held that employment-at-will was an absolute right
protected under the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution. Although Adair was
overruled by Phelps Dodge Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 313 U.S. 177, 182-87 (1941) (upholding sec.
8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, and prohibiting employers from firing or
failing to hire employees because of union membership), employers' absolute right to discharge
continued to be presumed until the late 1950's. As the length of employment terms increases
along with employees' reliance on their jobs, cdurts seek to protect employees by carving out
exceptions to the at-will rule. Comment, Employment at Will: Just Cause Protection Through
Mandatory Arbitration, 62 WASH. L. REv. 151, 152-53 (1987) (advocating statutory reform of
the doctrine); Comment, Unjust Discharge: Why Nonunion Employees Need a Just Cause Statute,
25 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 135, 138, (1989) [hereinafter Unjust Discharge) (advocating statutory
reform of the doctrine).
36. Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at 885.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 892. For the Toussaint court's analysis of the benefits of personnel manuals to
employers, see id.
39. Leikvold v. Valley View Community Hosp., 141 Ariz. 544, 688 P.2d 170, 174 (1984).
40. 688 P.2d at 172-73.
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The court sets forth a three-part process for rebutting this presump-
tion.41 First, the trier of fact decides whether the manual is part of the
employment contract. This question is to be determined from both the
manual's language and extrinsic evidence. The employer's actions and
statements pursuant to the manual are relevant extrinsic evidence.
Second, if the trier of fact decides that the manual is part of the
employment contract, what the terms of the contract were at the time
of termination must be decided. If the manual's terms are not ambigu-
ous, their construction is a question of law for the court. If the court
determines that the manual's language is ambiguous, however, the
trier of fact must interpret the contract's meaning, considering both
the manual's language and its extrinsic context. Third, once the terms
of the contract have been interpreted, the trier of fact decides whether
the contract has been breached.
3. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp.
In Foley, an employee was fired in violation of his employer's writ-
ten termination guidelines despite oral assurances that his position was
secure.42 In addition, the employee had given independent considera-
tion for his employment in the form of a noncompetition agreement.43
The California Supreme Court held that these facts, separately or in
combination, were sufficient to sustain a jury finding of wrongful dis-
charge.' The court held, however, that the employer was only liable
for contract, not tort, damages for such discharge.45
Foley strikes a fair balance between employers' and employees'
interests. Foley makes stating a cause of action easier for wrongfully
discharged employees. 46 Like Leikvold, Foley reasoned that employ-
ment-at-will is at best a rebuttable presumption.47 This presumption
may be rebutted by showing that an employee reasonably relied on the
employer's personnel manual.48 The court addressed the rights of
41. Id. at 174. For the Leikvold court's discussion of the three-step process, see id.
42. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 375, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211
(1988). The employer's "termination guidelines" set forth express grounds for discharge and a
mandatory seven-step pre-termination procedure. 765 P.2d at 375.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 388.
45. Id. at 401-02.
46. See Foley Ruling Will Have Salutary Effect, Says Attorney, Individual Empl. Rts., Feb. 14,
1989, at 3, col. 2 [hereinafter Foley Ruling] (evaluating Foley ruling).
47. Foley, 765 P.2d at 385.
48. Id. at 387.
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employers by protecting them from costly tort damages for most
wrongful discharges.49
II. PROTECTING EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE
INTERESTS: A NEED FOR BALANCE
Stewart represents a retrenchment in Washington employment law
that has produced confusion in the state's appellate courts.50 Stewart
inexplicably departed from precedent by withdrawing from the trier of
fact the right to determine whether an employer's policy manual pro-
visions modify an at-will employment contract. The case sets stan-
dards for interpreting personnel manual provisions and determining
employee reliance on them that are inconsistent with workplace reali-
ties. Stewart unsuccessfully tries to protect employers while with-
drawing protections previously available to employees. Washington
needs a personnel manual exception to the at-will doctrine that treats
both employees and employers with fairness and that can be consist-
ently applied.
A. An Unfocused Defense Of Employers' Right to Freedom From
Contract
1. Stewart's Construction of the Policy Manual
Stewart relies largely on a questionable construction of the Chevron
personnel manual's provision specifying what factors supervisors
"should consider" when laying off employees.51 The court concluded
that "should" may be interpreted as implying that supervisors are per-
mitted discretion in applying these factors. The court found that the
use of more obligatory terms, such as "shall," "will," and "must," in
other policy provisions supported this conclusion. The court found
"consider" to be a nonbinding term because the manual did not assign
any weight or value to the factors supervisors were supposed to con-
sider when making layoffs. The court reasoned that management need
not assign seniority any weight at all under the terms of the manual.
49. Foley Ruling, supra note 46, at 3, col. 2.
50. In Adler v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 53 Wash. App. 33, 36, 765 P.2d 910, 911 (1988),
decided two months after Stewart and citing that case, the court of appeals held that personnel
manuals written for supervisory personnel do not create specific expectations concerning
employee discharges. Nothing in Thompson, which holds that personnel manuals create an
atmosphere of fair treatment and job security on which employees may reasonably rely, indicates
that supervisory manuals should be excluded. See Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash.
2d 219, 230-31, 685 P.2d 1081, 1088 (1984).
51. Stewart v. Chevron Chem. Co., 111 Wash. 2d 609, 613, 762 P.2d 1143, 1145-46 (1988).
For the Stewart court's rationale for finding the manual's language nonbinding, see id. at 613-14,
762 P.2d 1145-46.
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Although the court's review of Stewart was not de novo, the court
resifted the facts, asserting that interpretation of a writing is a question
of law for the court.52 The court cited In re Estate of Larson" and
Williston5 4 as authority for this principle. In re Estate of Larson, how-
ever, concerned interpreting a document from the face of the instru-
ment without the aid of extrinsic evidence.55 Deciding whether a
provision in a personnel policy manual modifies an employment con-
tract necessitates the evaluation of extrinsic evidence.56
Williston states that, as a general rule, the proper construction of a
writing's terms is a question of law for the court.57 Courts mistrust
jurors' ability to resolve questions of fact requiring "nice discernment"
and "an educated mind," so the courts remove the construction of
writings from jury consideration by calling it a question of law.58
However, where the meaning of a writing is not clear on its face, defy-
ing application of legal rules of construction, and extrinsic evidence is
introduced to help interpret its meaning, the jury should interpret the
instrument's meaning.59 Leaving aside the stereotypes on which the
traditional assumptions about jurors are based, lay jurors are drawn
from a pool consisting largely of employers and employees. As
opposed to judges, who are trained in the rules of legal construction,
jurors are more likely to interpret an employer's personnel manual the
way most employers and employees would interpret it. Further, inter-
preting a personnel manual necessitates considering extrinsic
evidence.6"
In his dissent, Justice Dore opined that "should" ordinarily implies
duty or obligation.6 More obligatory language was used in other
manual provisidns concerning terminations.62 Thus, the language in
Chevron's personnel manual could reasonably be interpreted in more
than one way, making the jury the better determiner of its meaning.
52. Id. at 613, 762 P.2d at 1145.
53. 71 Wash. 2d 349. 354, 428 P.2d 558, 561 (1967).
54. 4 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 616, at 649 (3d ed. 1961).
55. Larson, 71 Wash. 2d at 353-54, 428 P.2d at 561 (finding that the unpaid loan from a
decedent to his son was, in fact, a gift).
56. Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 230, 685 P.2d 1081, 1088 (1984); see
supra notes 15-20, 27 and accompanying text.
57. 4 S. WILLISTON, supra note 54, at § 616, 648-49.
58. Id. at 649.
59. Id. at 652.
60. See supra notes 15-20, 27 and accompanying text.
61. Stewart v. Chevron Chem. Co., 11l Wash. 2d 609, 618, 762 P.2d 1145, 1148 (1988)
(Dore, J., dissenting).
62. Id. ("all pertinent factors will be given thorough consideration.")
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The legal construction of a personnel manual's terms is not relevant
to whether the manual modifies an employment contract. The benefit
employers derive from personnel manuals depends not on a legal con-
struction of their terms, but on what employees reasonably believe
them to mean.63 Judges at both the trial and supreme court level
believed that the manual's language promised specific treatment in
specific situations.' Yet the court held Chevron's employees, most of
whom probably were untrained in legal terminology, to a much higher
level of perception.
In Leikvold, the Arizona Supreme Court held that the interpreta-
tion of clear and unambiguous language presents a question of law for
the court.6" On the other hand, the interpretation of language that can
reasonably be understood in more than one way presents a question of
fact for the jury.6 6 This approach seems especially appropriate in the
employment contract context because jurors are better qualified to
determine a layperson's understanding of handbook language than
those educated in legal terminology. The Stewart court could have
taken this approach and remanded the case for a jury determination of
whether "should" and "consider" as used in Chevron's personnel
manual were contractually binding. This would have been consistent
with the court's previous determinations that whether a personnel
manual provision is a promise of specific treatment in a specific situa-
tion is a question of fact.67
2. The Court's Standard for Determining Employee Reliance
Although the evidence could have been weighed differently, the jury
had evidence to support its finding that Stewart knew about and relied
on the Chevron manual's layoff provision. Stewart was a supervisor
and had unrestricted access to the manual. 68 In addition, Stewart
63. Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284, 491 A.2d 1257, 1266 ("Many...
workers undoubtedly know little about contracts, and many ... would be unable to analyze the
language and terms of [a] manual."), modified, Woolley v. Hoffman-La Roche, 101 N.J. 10, 499
A.2d 515 (1985) (modified to permit defendant to bring an alternative defense).
64. Stewart, 111 Wash. 2d at 611, 612-14, 762 P.2d at 1145, 1147-48 (Dore, J., dissenting).
Neither the trial court nor the supreme court allowed the jury to decide whether the manual
provision constituted a promise of specific treatment in a specific situation.
65. Leikvold v. Valley View Community Hosp., 141 Ariz. 544, 688 P.2d 170, 174 (1984).
66. Id.
67. Brady v. Daily World, 105 Wash. 2d 770, 775, 718 P.2d 785, 788 (1986) (issues of
material fact must be decided to determine whether a personnel handbook was contractually
binding); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 233, 685 P.2d 1081, 1089-90
(1984).
68. Stewart, 111 Wash. 2d at 618-19, 762 P.2d at 1148 (Dore, J., dissenting) (non-supervisory
employees could consult the manual if accompanied by a supervisor).
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testified that he turned down a higher paying position because he
believed that Chevron's written policies meant Chevron would con-
sider seniority if layoffs were necessary.69
The court applied an inappropriate standard to determine whether
Stewart relied on the manual's layoff provision. The court reasoned
that if Stewart did not actually read the layoff provision until after he
was fired, he could not have known about it.70 Despite the court's
finding that Stewart had not read the layoff provision before his dis-
charge, Stewart presented evidence that he knew his seniority with
Chevron provided job protection under Chevron's layoff policy and
that he relied on that protection when refusing a job offering more
money.71 Chevron informed its employees about its personnel policies
through a videotape and newsletters.72 In addition, testimony by a
Chevron manager demonstrated that Chevron employees regarded the
manual policies as obligatory.73
The court's reasoning is inconsistent with the underlying rationale
of the personnel manual exception to employment-at-will. Written
personnel policies enhance the employment environment whether or
not specific employees have read them. 74 They become part of the
entire workplace's understanding of the employer's policies.75 Where
employers create an atmosphere of fair treatment and job security,
reliance is presumed.76
The factual determination of whether employee reliance on the
employer's written personnel policies can be presumed is critical to
determining whether those policies modify an employment contract.77
Triers of fact have the right to make factual determinations on the
basis of the evidence presented, even if the reviewing court would
weigh the evidence differently." Stewart presented evidence to the
jury that he relied on Chevron's written policies.79
69. Id. at 619-20, 762 P.2d at 1149 (Dore, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 614, 762 P.2d at 1146. Stewart claimed that, as soon as he heard that he had been
discharged, he immediately read Chevron's personnel manual provisions concerning layoffs.
Brief of Respondent at 3, Stewart, 111 Wash. 2d 609, 762 P.2d 1143 (No. 53357-1).
71. Stewart, 111 Wash. 2d at 619-20, 762 P.2d at 1149 (Dore, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 618, 762 P.2d at 1148.
73. Brief of Respondent at 8-9, Stewart, 111 Wash. 2d 609, 762 P.2d 1143 (No. 53357-1).
74. Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 230, 685 P.2d 1081, 1088 (1984).
75. Id. at 229-30, 685 P.2d at 1087-88.
76. Stewart, 111 Wash. 2d at 619, 685 P.2d at 1148 (Dore, J., dissenting).
77. Thompson, 102 Wash. 2d at 230, 685 P.2d at 1088.
78. Spero v. Lockwood, Inc., 111 Idaho 74, 721 P.2d 174, 175 (1986) (affirming a trier of
fact's decision that a personnel manual was not contractually binding).
79. Stewart, Ill Wash. 2d at 619-20, 762 P.2d at 1149 (Dore, J., dissenting).
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3. Fairness to Employees
Stewart disregards long-recognized realities of employment relation-
ships. Parties to commercial contracts are usually of nearly equal bar-
gaining power, and enter into agreements primarily for profit.80 On
the other hand, unrepresented employees are in no position to bargain
with employers regarding the terms and conditions of employment. 81
Furthermore, employees enter into employment contracts not only for
wages, but also for the status, reputation, self-worth, and financial
security employment offers.82
Employment contracts are usually unilateral; employers offer terms
which employees accept by performing.8" Non-union employees
rarely have leverage to negotiate terms. Indeed, at least one state has
declared legislatively that the unorganized worker is helpless to exer-
cise actual liberty of contract when dealing with employers.84 This is
especially true of older employees.85
The primary reason United States courts presently recognize excep-
tions to the employment-at-will doctrine is this lack of bargaining
power. 86 Even the most avid supporters of employment-at-will agree
that exceptions are required to prevent abuse.8 7 Limiting the grounds
on which an employee may recover for wrongful discharge defeats the
much needed current trend in United States law that extends greater
protection to employees.
Stewart particularly ignores the increasing vulnerability of older
employees who have spent most of their working lives in a single job.
In the last fifty years, older workers have found obtaining new jobs
increasingly difficult.88 The same is true of employees who have
worked for a single employer for many years.89 Stewart was fired after
80. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 407-08, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211
(1988) (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting).
81. 765 P.2d at 407-08.
82. Id.
83. Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880, 900 (1980)
(Ryan, J., concurring).
84. Watson v. Idaho Falls Consol. Hosp., 111 Idaho 44, 720 P.2d 632, 637 (1986) (affirming a
jury judgment that a hospital manual and employee manual were part of the employment
contract and the employee could recover for discharge in violation of those documents).
85. Mauk, supra note 1, at 205.
86. Id. at 254; Woolley v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284, 491 A.2d 1257, 1261,
modified, Woolley v. Hoffman-LaRoche, 101 N.J. 10, 499 A.2d 515 (1985) (modified to permit
defendant to bring an alternative defense).
87. Larson, supra note 1, at 219; Epstein, supra note 9, at 954-55.
88. Mauk, supra note 1, at 205.
89. Id.
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twenty-nine years with the same company and was not able to find
another job for three years after his discharge. 90
A common form of age discrimination is termination of older
employees for diminished performance.9 Stewart was fired because
he could not perform at the same level as younger employees. 92 Chev-
ron claimed that several of their senior employees had the lowest per-
formance ratings.93 Yet Chevron did not claim that any of these
employees were performing unsatisfactorily.94 Chevron elected to
make seniority and experience, as well as performance, factors for con-
sideration when layoffs were necessary. 95 Thus, Chevron recognized
the advantages of retaining competent employees past the peak of their
performance. Presumably Chevron understood that the loyalty, sta-
bility, and maturity of long-term employees weigh in the balance with
the higher levels of performance younger employees offer.
When employers prepare written personnel policies, employees have
no choice but to perform in accordance with them if they wish to keep
their jobs.96 The consequences of an employer's noncompliance are
particularly harsh with respect to older, or long-term employees. Fur-
ther, employees' lack of bargaining power means they have no voice in
negotiating terms employers offer. This makes declining to hold
employers to promises written in their personnel policies especially
unfair.
4. Fairness to Other Employers
Failure to hold employers responsible for their published personnel
policies is not only unfair to employees, it is unfair to employers who
apply their policies fairly and honestly. The vast majority of at-will
contracts do not lead to employer abuse. 97 A function of law is to
provide and enforce rules that will curb the behavior of those who
attempt to achieve an unfair advantage over others through unscrupu-
90. Brief for Respondent at 1-2, 4 n.6, Stewart v. Chevron Chem. Co., 111 Wash. 2d 609, 762
P.2d 1143 (1988) (No. 53357-1).
91. Peck, supra note 10, at 14.
92. Stewart, 111 Wash. 2d at 610, 762 P.2d at 1144.
93. Id.
94. See generally Brief for Appellant, Stewart, 111 Wash. 2d 609, 762 P.2d 1143 (No. 53357-
1). Brief nowhere alleges unsatisfactory work of Stewart or other senior employees.
95. Stewart, 111 Wash. 2d at 611, 762 P.2d at 1144.
96. Wooley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, 99 N.J. 284, 491 A.2d 1257, 1265 (1985), modified,
Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, 101 N.J. 10, 499 A.2d 515 (1985) (modified to permit defendant
to bring an alternative defense); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 230, 685
P.2d 1081, 1088 (1984).
97. Epstein, supra note 9, at 955.
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lous or thoughtless behavior.98 , Employers may foster good relations
in the workplace by establishing fair, written policies,99 and by
rewarding efficient employees with continued employment, while dis-
charging inefficient employees." ° It is difficult to do both, however,
where job security is a key concern. Stewart allows employers to have
it both ways-to benefit from the illusion of job security, while retain-
ing the flexibility of actual employment-at-will to retain only the most
efficient performers. This is unfair to other employers, who must
choose between assuring job security and retaining the flexibility to
keep only their most efficient performers.
The personnel manual exception to employment-at-will is the most
valuable exception available in Washington because it permits employ-
ees to make an informed choice among employers, based on personnel
policies.101 Courts have begun to recognize that employees do not
necessarily contract to perform a job in exchange for wages only. An
employee and employer may also agree to exchange work for consider-
ation unrelated to wages-job security, for example. 1°2 As the labor
pool decreases and employers compete more heavily for entry level
employees, 10 3 permitting employers to -gain a favorable reputation for
policies that they are not obligated to honor is unfair to employers
who deal honestly with their workforce.
5. Making Personnel Policies Contractually Binding: The Minimal
Burden on Employers
Employers desiring to avoid being bound by their personnel policies
may do so in a variety of ways. They may make employment-at-will
an express term of the employment contract.' 4 They may contract
98. Peck, supra note 10, at 7-8.
99. Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 881, 892 (1980); see
supra note 38 and accompanying text.
100. Epstein, supra note 9, at 968.
101. See Note, Three New Exceptions to the Employment at Will Doctrine-Thompson v. St.
Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (f984), 60 WASH. L. REv. 209, 214-15
(commending Thompson, but advocating further extension of protection against unjust
discharge).
102. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 386, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211
(1988); Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at 900.
103. See, eg., Wall Street J., June 3, 1986, at 1, col. 5 (entry level employees are so scarce in
some areas that some employers must meet workloads with extra shifts); Wash. Post, Nov. 25,
1985, at VBI, col. 3 (employers meet the competition for a shrinking entry-level workforce by
recruiting senior citizens, full-time homemakers, and the physically challenged; offering higher
wages; providing more and different kinds of benefits, such as transportation costs and
scholarships; permitting flexible work hours; and giving bonuses to present employees who
recruit new employees).
104. Mauk, supra note 1, at 218; Unjust Discharge, supra note 35, at 142.
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for a specific level of performance, and their right to discharge when
performance falls below that level will be respected. t 5 They may
draft a satisfaction clause under which a discharge will be lawful if
they have, in good faith, been dissatisfied with an employee's perform-
ance.'0 6 They may provide a probationary period before contract or
manual protections apply. 10 7 They may qualify their policy state-
ments with clear and prominent disclaimers that the policies are not
binding.'0 8 Employers may review their policies whenever they
choose to ensure that they are still in the company's interest. 0 9
Employers may inform their employees that the employers may uni-
laterally change their personnel policies without notice." 0 Employers
may then change their written personnel policies whenever they
choose, so long as written policies which exist at any given time are
applied consistently to all employees."'
Employers also may follow their written policies without necessarily
obtaining an undesirable result." 2 In Stewart, the written policy
merely required that Chevron consider Stewart's seniority along with
experience and performance. Internal memos and oral testimony,
however, showed that Chevron failed to meet even this minimal bur-
den of compliance." 3 Of course, employers may choose to issue no
policy statements at all.' With so many protections available to
employers, the responsibility of adhering to their own personnel poli-
cies imposes very little burden.
105. Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at 897.
106. Id. at 896-97, 902.
107. Duldalao v. St. Mary of Nazareth Hosp., 115 11. 2d 482, 505 N.E.2d 314, 319-20
(1987).
108. Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, 99 N.J. 284, 491 A.2d 1257, 1270-71 (1985), modified,
Woolley v. Hoffman-LaRoche, 101 N.J. 10, 499 A.2d 515 (1985) (modified to permit defendant
to bring an alternative defense); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 230-31,
685 P.2d 1081, 1088 (1984); Larson, supra note 1, at 239-40; Mauk, supra note 1, at 217-19.
109. Mauk, supra note 1, at 217.
110. Thompson, 102 Wash. 2d at 231, 685 P.2d at 1088; Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880, 894-95 (1980).
111. Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at 895.
112. For a case in which an employee lost an unlawful discharge suit because the court
decided the employer adhered to its personnel policies when discharging her, see, Wolk v. Saks
Fifth Avenue Inc., 728 F.2d 221, 224-25 (3d Cir. 1984).
113. Stewart, 111 Wash. 2d 609, 617, 762 P.2d 1143, 1147 (Dore, J., dissenting) ("[t]he
method for selecting surplus employees will be based on job performance ... against the usual
practice of using classification and seniority" (emphasis added)).
114. Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at 892; Thompson, 102 Wash. 2d at 229, 685 P.2d at 1087.
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B. A Sharper Focus on the Employment Relationship
Washington needs a consistent rule for applying the personnel man-
ual exception to employment-at-will. This rule should be fair to both
employees and employers. Toussaint, the leading case concerning the
personnel manual exception, anticipated a stricter standard for
employers than Washington courts have applied."1 Leikvold v. Val-
ley View Community Hospital 16 adopted the Toussaint court's reason-
ing and provided a rule that is admirably clear and easy to apply.1 17
This rule makes the trier of fact responsible for deciding whether an
employer's personnel manual modifies an at-will employment con-
tract. Unless the terms of the manual are unambiguous, the trier of
fact also decides what the terms of the employment contract, as modi-
fied by the manual, were at the time the employee was discharged.
Finally, the trier of fact decides if the contract has been breached.
The Washington Supreme Court came halfway to a just determina-
tion in Stewart by overruling the trial court's determination that the
language in Chevron's personnel manual constituted a promise as a
matter of law." 8 The Washington Supreme Court, however, erred
just as badly by holding that the manual's language was not a promise
as a matter of law.119 The court could have remanded the case for a
jury determination of whether the ambiguous language constituted a
promise of specific treatment in a specific situation)1 2 °
In addition to greater clarity in the law governing modification of
employment-at-will contracts by personnel manual provisions, Wash-
ington needs to bring employer and employee protections into better
balance. The California court addressed this need for balance in Foley
and managed to fairly protect the interests of both employees and
employers.1 2 ' The employees' interest in job security is protected by
providing liberal grounds on which an implied contract may be found,
including statements in employers' personnel manuals.122 The
115. Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at 892; see also supra notes 28-29, 33-38 and accompanying text
(discussing the Toussaint rule).
116. 141 Ariz. 544, 688 P.2d 170 (1984).
117. Id. at 174. For a discussion of the Leikvold rule, see id.
118. Stewart v. Chevron Chem. Co., 111 Wash. 2d 609, 611, 614, 762 P.2d 1143, 1144, 1146
(1988).
119. Id. at 614, 762 P.2d at 1146.
120. Leikyold, 688 P.2d at 174.
121. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 387, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211
(1988) (an implied contract may be found from the employer's policies, practices,
communications to employees, and actions reflecting assurance of continued employment, and
from the practices of the industry in which the employee is employed).
122. Id. at 388.
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employers' interest in economic security is protected by limiting recov-
ery for unjust discharges to contract only, thereby precluding poten-
tially ruinous tort damages. 123
Washington's employment law differs from California's in that
Washington recognizes two ways in which statements in personnel
manuals may be contractually binding. 124 California law simply pro-
vides that such statements may be sufficient evidence of an implied
contract. 125 Despite this difference, Washington could follow Foley in
striking a fair balance between employers' and employees' interests.
The Washington court has specifically refused to recognize an action
in tort or contract for violation of an implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing in wrongful discharge cases. 126 Fairness demands that
the Washington court counterbalance this additional protection of an
employer's right to discharge at-will by curbing employers' ability to
escape enforcement of their written personnel policies through seman-
tic ambiguity.
Washington courts currently overprotect employers and underpro-
tect employees. Although the court did not discuss economic consid-
erations in Stewart, it may be concerned that holding employers
contractually accountable for their personnel policies would put
Washington employers at a competitive disadvantage, or discourage
business investment in Washington. This concern, however, has not
deterred more than half the jurisdictions in the United States from
recognizing the personnel manual exception to employment-at-will. 27
Further, the right to discharge at-will may not be particularly impor-
tant to most employers. During the "give-back" era of the early
1980's, when unions were forced to make concessions in wages and
benefits to employers because of a poor economy, employers rarely, if
ever, demanded concessions in job security. 128 Most employers realize
123. Id. at 396, 401. California still permits an action in tort for discharges in violation of
public policy. Id. at 378.
124. Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 228-30, 685 P.2d 1081, 1086-87
(1984); see also supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text (discussing the two ways that a
personnel manual may be contractually binding).
125. Foley, 765 P.2d at 388.
126. Thompson, 102 Wash. 2d at 227-28, 685 P.2d at 1086-87.
127. Annotation, Right to Discharge, supra note 30, at 125-37.
128. See generally, Analysis of Trends in Collective Bargaining for Employee Benefits, Pens.
Rep. (BNA) No 436, (c) at 510 (March 21, 1983). A survey of 1,461 collective bargaining
agreements in 1982 revealed concessions to employers on wages and benefits but none on
employment security. On the contrary, a number of employers augmented or initiated job
security provisions, ranging from retraining programs to a pilot lifetime employment experiment.
Id.
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that it is good business to be a good employer. 129 Washington does
not need to encourage business development by stripping Washington
employees of rights enjoyed by employees in most other states.
III. CONCLUSION
Washington has taken a restrictive view of the personnel manual
exception to the employment-at-will doctrine. Stewart decided ques-
tions of fact against an employee that had been decided in his favor by
a jury. The court's strict construction of Chevron's personnel man-
ual's terms severely limits the ability of wrongfully discharged employ-
ees to bring a cause of action under the personnel manual exception to
the employment-at-will doctrine. The court applied a standard for
determining employee reliance on a personnel manual that does not
realistically consider workplace realities. The decision extended
unnecessary protection to employers without considering employees'
greater need for protection. The result was unfair, both to employees,
particularly older and long-term employees, and the majority of
employers, who treat their employees with fairness.
Washington needs a consistent rule that delegates the determination
of whether a personnel manual, absent a clear disclaimer, is contractu-
ally binding to the trier of fact. Such a rule would not only provide
greater certainty to employers and employees but also would balance
more equitably their respective interests.
Marilou Rickert
129. See, eg., Seattle Times, April 23, 1989, at El, col. 4 (nonunion employers watch union
contracts to see what they have to do to compete with union employers); Wash. Post, supra note
103; Pens. Rep. (BNA), supra note 128.
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